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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No, 950644-CA 
V. : 
WILLIAM WILLEY, III, : Priority 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions of possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1995) and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, also a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5(l) (1994), in the Seventh 
Judicial District Court in and For San Juan County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court properly determine that what started 
as a routine traffic stop for an equipment violation, and hence a 
seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, reverted to a voluntary 
encounter once the arresting officer issued a verbal warning to 
the driver and the driver, rather than simply proceeding on his 
way, decided to replace his burned out license plate light and 
the officer assisted him by illuminating the area with his 
flashlight while the driver attempted to change the bulb? 
The trial court's determination that the seizure reverted to 
a voluntary encounter is most aptly described as a question of 
law that is reviewed for correctness. However, because of its 
highly fact sensitive nature, the trial court's determination 
should be afforded some discretion. See generally State v. Pena. 
869 P.2d 932, 935-939 (Utah 1994) (explaining analytical approach 
for determining what standard of review and measure of discretion 
should be afforded trial court determinations of fact sensitive 
legal conclusions). 
2. Did the trial court properly determine that the 
arresting officer had probable cause to believe that the vehicle 
in which defendant was a passenger may have contained open 
containers of alcohol where the officer smelled the odor of 
alcohol on the breath of the driver, saw an open "12-pack" of 
beer from which several containers were missing, and both the 
open 12-pack and a cooler were in the passenger compartment 
within reach of the driver and his passenger? 
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This Court reviews Ma trial court's determination of whether 
a particular set of facts constitutes probable cause 
nondeferentially for correctness, affording a measure of 
discretion to the trial court." State v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d 220, 
225 (Utah App. 1995) (citations omitted). 
3. Did the trial court properly determine that defendant 
was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he voluntarily 
elected to drive his friend's vehicle to the sheriff's office and 
receive his citation for possession of drug paraphernalia there 
instead of receiving his citation at the scene of the initial 
stop and requiring the officer to have the vehicle towed and 
impounded? 
The trial court's custody determination should be treated as 
a question of law that, though reviewed nondeferentially, is 
nonetheless afforded a measure of discretion. See generally 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-939 (Utah 1994) (explaining 
analytical approach for determining what standard of review and 
measure of discretion should be afforded trial court 
determinations of fact sensitive legal conclusions). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
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describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1995) and possession of 
drug paraphernalia, also a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5(l) (1994) (R. 4-6). Defendant filed a 
motion to suppress evidence that was seized by police during a 
warrantless search of the vehicle in which defendant was a 
passenger (R. 10-11). The trial court denied that motion (R. 78-
83), and defendant entered conditional pleas of guilty under 
which he reserved the right to challenge the denial of his motion 
to suppress on appeal (R. 17-18, 83, 93, 98).x (A copy of the 
trial court's findings, which were made from the bench, are 
attached hereto as addendum A.) 
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS 
The facts recited below are drawn from the transcript of the 
hearing on defendant's motion to suppress and are recited in the 
1
 Because this case involves an appeal from misdemeanor 
convictions, it would normally be prosecuted by the appropriate 
county attorney, in this case, the San Juan County Attorney. The 
Attorney General's Office agreed to prosecute the appeal because 
it was already prosecuting the appeal from co-defendant 
Patefield's felony drug possession conviction, State v. 
Patefield, No. 950736-CA, in which Patefield raises two of the 
three issues presented herein. 
4 
light most favorable to the trial court's findings. State v. 
Anderson, 283 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah 1996); State v. Delaney. 
869 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1994). 
On the night of April 28, 1995, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper 
Rick Eldredge saw an older model Volkswagen van traveling on SR-
191 north of Monticello, Utah. It was dark at the time, and 
Eldredge noticed that the license plate light was burned out. 
The trooper decided to stop the vehicle to issue a verbal warning 
for failure to have the rear license plate illuminated as 
required under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-120(b) (1995) (R. 21-23). 
Upon stopping the vehicle, Eldredge asked the driver for 
identification. The driver produced a driver's license that 
indicated he was Michael Patefield. Eldredge told Patefield that 
he stopped him because his license plate light was burned out, 
issued a verbal warning for failure to have a properly 
illuminated license plate, and told Patefield to uget it fixed" 
(R. 23, 34).2 
Patefield explained that he had recently fixed the light and 
asked if he could get out and fix it again. Eldredge agreed that 
he could, and the passenger, defendant William Willey, retrieved 
a light bulb from glove box and handed it to Patefield (R. 23, 
2
 It was undisputed that Eldredge had by then returned 
Patefield's driver's license and that Eldredge did not run either 
a license or warrants check (R. 45). 
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34). 
Patefield and Eldredge walked to the rear of the vehicle, 
and Eldredge held his flashlight so that Patefield could see 
better as he tried to replace the burned out bulb (R. 23, 35). 
Patefield was unable to replace the bulb and decided to get some 
tools out of the van. Eldredge followed Patefield as he went 
around the passenger side of the van, opened the sliding door 
just behind the front passenger seat and pulled out a red tool 
box (R. 23-4) . Eldredge could see inside the van as he watched 
Patefield gather the tools he needed to fix the light. Among 
other things, Eldredge saw a lot of food, backpacks, clothes and 
coolers, which led him to conclude that the two men were going 
camping (R. 24, 39). 
Eldredge also saw several "12-packs'' of beer next to the 
sliding door. One of the 12-packs had been opened, and it 
appeared that about half of the containers were gone. Once 
Patefield had the tools he needed, and he and Eldredge again 
moved to the rear of the vehicle so that Patefield could fix the 
light (R. 23-24) . 
As Patefield tried to fix the light, he and Eldredge visited 
about where Patefield and defendant had been and where they were 
going (R. 24). Specifically, Patefield said that he and 
defendant were on their way to Lake Powell for a camping trip (R. 
35) . 
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During their conversation, Eldredge smelled the odor of 
alcohol on Patefield's breath. He let Patefield try to fix the 
light, but Patefield was again unable to do so. Eldredge 
eventually told him that they could "fix it later" (R. 25). 
Eldredge told Patefield he was concerned about the odor of 
alcohol on Patefield's breath and the open box of beer in the 
van. He then asked Patefield if he had been drinking, and 
Patefield said that he had beer for dinner two or three hours 
earlier (R. 25). Eldredge told Patefield that he would like 
check inside the van to make sure there were no open containers 
of alcohol in the vehicle (R. 25). 
Patefield went to the front of the van and told defendant 
that "the officer wanted to look for open containers" and asked 
defendant to "please get out" (R. 25). Defendant got out of the 
van and brought with him a dog that had been sitting on the back 
seat at the rear of the van. Defendant took the dog to the side 
of the road and waited with Patefield while Eldredge looked in 
the van (R. 25). 
The sliding door was still open, and Eldredge leaned across 
the coolers and clothes so that he could look directly behind the 
driver's seat. There was a pile of coats or blankets behind the 
driver's seat, and Eldredge lifted them up to make sure that no 
open containers had been hidden beneath them (R. 25). 
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As Eldredge leaned into the van, he could smell the odor of 
burnt marijuana coming from one or two "fanny packs'' that were 
laying in the center of the van on top of the food and clothing 
(R. 25). The packs were "right in front of [Eldredge7s] face, 
probably six inches from [his] face" (R. 26) . Eldredge backed 
up, looked at Patefield and said, "I can smell marijuana in one 
or both of th[ose] fanny packs" (R. 26). When Eldredge said he 
did not know exactly which one the smell was coming from, 
Patefield, "without saying a word, . . . reached in, grabbed one 
of the fanny packs, zipped it open, [and] handed [Eldredge] a 
marijuana pipe" (R. 26). 
Eldredge looked at the pipe and took the fanny pack away 
from Patefield. The trooper opened the fanny pack further and 
saw that it contained several film canisters. Patefield grabbed 
one of the canisters and held it behind his back. Eldredge stuck 
out his hand and instructed Patefield to give him the canister. 
Patefield responded, "[n]o. I'll be in a lot of trouble for this 
one" (R. 26). Eldredge told Patefield that he was already in 
trouble, and Patefield acted like he was going to throw the 
canister (R. 26). 
As Patefield turned, apparently to ready himself to throw 
the canister, Eldredge grabbed him by the arm and pushed him into 
the van and onto the passenger seat. Eldredge "snatched" the 
canister away from Patefield, turned him around and handcuffed 
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him (R. 26) . Eldredge opened the canister and saw that it 
contained what he believed to be LSD (R. 27) . 
Eldredge took Patefield back to his patrol car, apprised him 
of his rights under Miranda, and asked Patefield if he understood 
his rights. Patefield said, My]es," and Eldredge asked him if 
he would speak to him without having an attorney present (R. 27). 
Patefield answered, Mi]t depends on what the question is[,]" and 
Eldredge told Patefield that he could "pick and choose" what 
questions he wanted to answer because he (Patefield) was 
"basically the boss when it c[ame] to [answering or not answering 
questions]" (R. 27). The only question that Eldredge asked 
Patefield was whether there were any more controlled substances 
in the van, and Patefield said, u[n]o" (R. 27). 
After having Patefield sit in his patrol car, Eldredge 
approached defendant. Eldredge told defendant that Patefield was 
under arrest for possession of LSD. Eldredge also specifically 
told defendant that he was not under arrest but indicated that he 
wanted to ask defendant some questions. While Eldredge did not 
give defendant a Miranda since he had already told defendant he 
was not under arrest, Eldredge did tell defendant he that did not 
have to answer any questions. Defendant indicated that he 
understood that he did not have to answer Eldredge's questions, 
and Eldredge asked him if there was any marijuana or other 
controlled substances in the van (R. 27-8). Defendant did not 
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say anything, but he ushook his head no and shrugged his 
shoulders as if to say 'no' or XI don't know'" (R. 28). 
Eldredge returned to the van and looked through the other 
fanny pack. It contained some marijuana inside of a film 
canister, some "zig-zag" papers, a knife and some other personal 
items but no identification (R. 28). Because neither defendant 
nor Patefield had claimed that fanny pack, Eldredge returned to 
his patrol car and asked Patefield if it was his. Patefield said 
"[n]o" and motioned that it belonged to defendant (R. 28). 
Eldredge then asked defendant if he knew who owned the fanny 
pack, and defendant said he did not know who it belonged to (R. 
28) . 
Eldredge also found a bamboo pipe that appeared to have 
marijuana residue on it in a backpack that was claimed by 
defendant (R. 28-9). Finally, Eldredge found a Tupperware bowl 
full of marijuana underneath a mattress at the rear of the van 
(R. 29). 
Eldredge told defendant that he was not going to arrest him 
but that he was going to cite him for possession of drug 
paraphernalia. Eldredge then gave Patefield the choice of either 
consenting to having defendant drive his vehicle or having it 
towed by a wrecker. Patefield opted to allow defendant to drive 
the van, and defendant agreed to do so (R. 29, 42). Patefield 
then told Eldredge that he felt very sick and that he may have 
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"soiled his pants'' (R. 29) . 
Eldredge told defendant that he would give him a citation 
for possession of drug paraphernalia at the Public Safety-
Building and took his driver's license. He also explained that 
defendant could then find out exactly how much it would cost to 
bail Patefield out of jail and told defendant to follow him to 
the Public Safety Building (R. 29, 30, 42). 
As Eldredge took Patefield to the Public Safety Building, 
defendant followed behind him "very slowly" in Patefield's van 
(R. 30, 41). Indeed, at some point, Eldredge even lost sight of 
defendant (R. 41). That fact did not concern Eldredge, however, 
because he was not going to arrest defendant since he believed 
there was insufficient evidence to connect defendant to the drugs 
found in Patefield's van (R. 41-2). 
By the time Eldredge and Patefield arrived at the Public 
Safety Building, Eldredge was concerned about Patefield's 
behavior. Specifically, Patefield was in a "cold sweat" and was 
holding his stomach as if he were sick (R. 30). Suspecting that 
Patefield might be under the influence of LSD, Eldredge decided 
to call Trooper Sanford Randall, a drug recognition expert who 
knew more about the effects of LSD than did Eldredge. Randall 
advised Eldredge to conduct some field sobriety tests (R. 3 0-1).3 
3
 The results of the filed sobriety tests that Eldredge 
administered on Patefield do not appear on the record on appeal. 
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While waiting for defendant to arrive at the Public Safety 
Building, Eldredge searched through the unclaimed fanny pack in 
which he had already found some marijuana and zig-zag papers (R. 
31, 42) . He found a Steamboat Springs, Colorado dog tag that was 
rolled up in a zig-zag paper (R.31-33). Eldredge not only knew 
that defendant was from Steamboat Springs, he also knew defendant 
had a dog because the dog was with him in the van (R. 31, 42). 
When defendant arrived at the Public Safety Building, 
Eldredge met him in the lobby. Eldredge asked defendant "how 
long he had owned the dog[,]" and defendant replied "around seven 
years" (R. 32, 42-3) . Eldredge then told defendant that he 
suspected defendant owned the fanny pack in which there was 
marijuana because the pack also contained a dog tag that belonged 
to defendant's dog. Defendant did not respond to Eldredge's 
comment (R. 32), and he was ultimately arrested for possession of 
the marijuana (R. 4-6). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly determined that the concededly 
valid stop of the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger 
reverted to a consensual encounter before the arresting officer 
had any interaction with defendant. Specifically, after Trooper 
Eldredge issued a verbal warning about the burned out license 
plate light and told the driver he should "get it fixed," it was 
clear the traffic stop was at an end. Rather than simply 
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proceeding on his way, the driver voluntarily elected to see if 
he could fix the light immediately. The fact that Eldredge 
stayed on the scene and used his flashlight to illuminate the 
area while the driver attempted to fix the light does not mean 
the encounter was a continued detention for Fourth Amendment 
purposes. Rather, as the trial court recognized, Eldredge "was 
just acting as any citizen would" by helping the driver replace 
the faulty light (R. 78). 
Eldredge's detection of the odor of alcohol on the driver's 
breath, the presence of an opened 12-pack of beer with several 
containers missing that -- along with a cooler -- was within 
reach of the driver and passenger justified the trooper's 
remaining actions. As the trial court recognized, those 
collective facts gave rise to probable cause to believe there 
were open containers of alcohol in the van. Eldredge's search of 
the van for open containers was therefore proper. Once Eldredge 
smelled the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from one of two 
fanny packs, his decision to search those packs and the rest of 
the van for controlled substances was proper. 
Finally, although defendant was the subject of a seizure for 
Fourth Amendment purposes at the time he arrived at the Public 
Safety Building, he was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. 
Eldredge had previously told defendant he was not under arrest 
and had released the van to him so that he could drive it to the 
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sheriff's officer, thereby saving his friend the expense of 
having it towed and impounded. Defendant was never handcuffed or 
asked questions that were accusatory in form or tone, and he was 
not taken to an interrogation room. The trial court's 
determination that defendant was not in custody should therefore 
be affirmed because it is supported by the record evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
INVESTIGATIVE STOP OF THE VEHICLE IN WHICH DEFENDANT 
WAS A PASSENGER REVERTED TO A VOLUNTARY LEVEL ONE 
ENCOUNTER 
In keeping with State v. Hiaains. 884 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1994), 
and State v. Castner. 825 P.2d 699 (Utah App. 1992), the trial 
court properly determined that what started as a routine traffic 
stop, and hence a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, reverted 
to a voluntary encounter between the driver and Trooper Eldredge 
once Eldredge issued a verbal warning to the driver for having a 
burned out license plate light and told him to "get it fixed" (R. 
34) .4 At that point, a reasonable person would have felt free to 
4
 A joint hearing on both defendant's and the driver's 
motions to suppress was held below (R. 19-21). That hearing was 
conducted with the apparent understanding that both the driver 
and defendant were seized when the van was stopped. The State 
need not discuss on appeal whether defendant, a mere passenger, 
was seized from the outset because any detention was plainly 
justified. See Hiaains, 884 P.2d at 1244. As such, no 
determination of whether defendant was seized was compelled at 
trial nor is one compelled on appeal. Id. (assuming arguendo, 
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leave, and the trial court properly determined that it was the 
driver who voluntarily extended the encounter by deciding he 
wanted to replace the burned out light bulb while Eldredge was 
present (R. 78). The fact that Eldredge assisted the driver by 
illuminating the area with his flashlight in no way demonstrates 
that he "stayed and created the appearance of a continued 
detention and investigation" as defendant argues on appeal. Br. 
of Appellant at 7. Rather, as the trial court found, Patefield's 
decision to fix the burned out light immediately was a "voluntary 
act," and Eldredge "was just acting as any citizen would" by 
helping Patefield replace the burned out bulb (R. 78). 
In determining the limits of police conduct during a traffic 
stop, courts employ a two-prong analysis: "whether the officer's 
action was justified at its inception, and whether [the resulting 
detention] was reasonably related [in scope] to the circumstances 
that justified the interference in the first place." Terry v. 
Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968). Accord. State 
v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-1132 (Utah 1994). Here, the trial 
court found the initial stop was justified because the license 
plate light of Patefield's van was burned out, a violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-120(b) (1995) (R. 78). Defendant concedes 
that point on appeal. Br. of Appellant at 6. Defendant argues, 
but refusing to hold, that mere passenger in a stopped automobile 
was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes). 
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however, that Eldredge exceeded the scope of detention and that 
an "unlawful detention in this case began, most conservatively, 
at the point when the trooper gave a verbal warning and did not 
allow the occupants to proceed on their way." Br. of Appellant 
at 10. Defendant's assertion is based on both a misapprehension 
of the facts as found by the trial court and a misapplication of 
the pertinent law to the facts presented. 
The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that 
Once a person is seized for Fourth Amendment Purposes, 
the seizure does not cease simply because the police 
formulate an uncommunicated intention that the seized 
person may go on his or her way. For the seizure to 
end, it must be clear to the seized person, either from 
the words of the officer or the clear import of the 
circumstances, that the person is at liberty to go 
about his or her business. 
Higgins, 884 P.2d at 1244 (citation omitted). 
In this case, Eldredge issued a verbal warning to Patefield 
about the burned out licence plate light and told Patefield "to 
get it fixed" (R. 23, 34). It was undisputed that Eldredge was 
no longer retaining Patefield's driver's license or other 
materials at that point, and Eldredge did not even run a license 
or warrants check (R. 45). Patefield could have simply accepted 
the trooper's warning and proceeding on his way. Instead, after 
explaining that he had just recently fixed the burned out light 
and knowing that he had another replacement light bulb in his 
glove compartment, Patefield decided on his own accord that he 
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wanted to fix the problem immediately. 
At the suppression hearing, defendant conceded that Eldredge 
did not order or command Patefield to fix the light immediately, 
and the trial court found that Patefield elected to do so on his 
own volition (R. 51-6). As such, the trial court properly 
determined that the encounter between Patefield and Eldredge from 
that point forward was a level one, consensual police-citizen 
encounter. Cf. Castner, 825 P.2d at 705 (noting that the 
defendant was no longer the subject of a Fourth Amendment seizure 
where the officer had returned his driver's license, issued a 
citation, and the defendant voluntarily extended the encounter by 
questioning the officer about where and how to take care of the 
citation and asking the officer why he had asked if there were 
any weapons in his vehicle). 
Defendant's claim on appeal that Eldredge "stayed and 
created the appearance of a continued detention and investigation 
[by] shadow[ing] Patefield as he attempted to fix the licence 
plate light and get tools [from his van]" (Br. of Appellant at 7) 
is an attempt to alter the facts as found by the trial court 
without saddling the burden of showing that court's findings were 
clearly erroneous. It was the trial court's prerogative to make 
findings about the nature and character of the interaction 
between Eldredge and Patefield. The thrust of the trial court's 
ruling evidences its determination that the encounter was not 
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confrontational or hostile but was instead cooperative and 
friendly in nature. Eldredge merely assisted Patefield by 
illuminating the area with his flashlight while Patefield 
attempted to replace the burned out bulb during the darkness of 
night on the side of the highway. 
Certainly, Eldredge could also have simply hopped in his 
patrol car and left Patefield to his own devices. But, as the 
trial court suggested, that is not what most citizens in 
Eldredge's position would have done (R. 78). Instead, most 
citizens would have stayed and helped Patefield, and we should 
expect at least that much if not more from members of our law 
enforcement community. 
In light of the facts as found by the trial court, "the 
words of [Trooper Eldredge and] the clear import of the 
circumstances" would have made clear to a reasonable person in 
Patefield's position that they were uat liberty free to go about 
[their] business." Higgins. 884 P.2d at 1244. The trial court's 
conclusion that the level two traffic stop reverted to a level 
one encounter should therefore be affirmed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT ELDREDGE HAD 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH PATEFIELD'S VAN FOR OPEN 
CONTAINERS OF ALCOHOL 
The trial court properly determined that the facts known to 
Eldredge at the time he searched Patefield's van provided 
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probable cause to believe there were open containers of alcohol 
in the van. This Court reviews ua trial court's determination of 
whether a particular set of facts constitutes probable cause 
nondeferentially for correctness, affording a measure of 
discretion to the trial court." State v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d 220, 
225 (Utah App. 1995) (citations omitted). Accordingly, this 
Court "does not conduct a close, de novo review of the trial 
court's probable cause determination; rather, [it] review[s] the 
placement of the legal fences which delimit the pasture of trail 
court discretion to determine what constitutes probable cause." 
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). So 
reviewed, the facts presented to the trial court established 
probable cause. 
Determinations of whether probable cause exists require a 
common sense assessment of the totality of the circumstances 
confronting the officer at the time of the search. State v. 
Dorsey. 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 1986). The facts need not 
demonstrate with certainty that incriminating evidence will be 
discovered: 
In dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name 
implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not 
technical; they are factual and practical 
considerations of every day life on which reasonable 
and prudent [persons], not legal technicians, act. The 
standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what 
must be proved. 
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Dorsey, 731 P.2d at 1088 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 
U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310 (1949)). Because probable 
cause does not require certainty, "[t]he line between 'mere 
suspicion and probable cause . . . necessarily must be drawn by 
an act of judgment formed in the light of the particular 
situation and with account taken of all the circumstances.'" Id. 
(quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176, 69 S. Ct. at 1311). 
Courts must also be mindful of the degree of proof required 
to move an officer's belief to the level of probable cause. 
Probable cause means "a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found[;]" that "requires only a . . . 
substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of 
such activity." Illinois V, Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 243,44 
n.13 (1983). As such, "[t]he quantum of evidence needed for 
probable cause is significantly less than that needed to prove 
guilt" Spurgeon. 904 P.2d at 226 (citation omitted), and it "does 
not require more that a rationally based conclusion of 
probability[.]" Dorsey. 731 P.2d at 1088. Rather, "probable cause 
is only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of 
criminal activity." Spurgeon. 904 P.2d at 227 (citations 
omitted). 
In this case, Eldredge had more that a mere suspicion that 
Patefield's van contained evidence of a crime. As the trial 
court implicitly recognized, the information known to Eldredge at 
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the time of the search would have prompted a "prudent, 
reasonable, cautious police officer" to conclude that there was a 
"substantial chance'' the van contained open containers of 
alcohol. 
While defendant properly notes that Eldredge based his 
probable cause assessment on the fact that Patefield had alcohol 
on his breath and that the van contained an open 12-pack from 
which several containers were missing, defendant is wrong when he 
asserts that "no other factors" supported Eldredge's suspicion of 
open containers. Br. of Appellant at 10-11.5 Specifically, the 
reasonable inference from the evidence presented was that the 
open 12-pack of beer and the coolers were within defendant's and 
Patefield's reach because they were behind the front seat and by 
the sliding door that opened on the side of the van. That much 
can be inferred from the fact that Eldredge, who searched the van 
through the open sliding door, had to "lean over the coolers" as 
he reached across to the other side of the van to lift up the 
blankets and clothes that were "directly behind the driver's 
seat." (R. 24-5) . 
5
 Defendant's assertion ignores the fact that, while the 
trial court focused primarily on the odor of alcohol and presence 
of 12-packs of beer (one of which was opened), the trial court 
made clear that those two facts had to be considered "in view of 
all the circumstances" (R. 79). 
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Under the totality of the circumstances, while Eldredge 
candidly acknowledged that he did not suspect Patefield was 
impaired, it was reasonable for him to suspect that Patefield may 
have recently had a drink of beer and that the open beer 
container was still in the van. It may have been stashed behind 
the driver's seat where Eldredge looked first, or it might have 
been in one of the coolers. 
The fact that Eldredge's suspicion about an open container 
proved wrong does not mean that the trial court's finding of 
probable cause was in error. Rather, as the trial court 
implicitly recognized (R. 81), a finding of probable cause is not 
defeated simply because an officer's belief proves wrong: 
Because many situations which confront officers in the 
course of executing their duties are more or less 
ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on 
their part. But the mistakes must be those of 
reasonable [persons], acting on facts leading sensibly 
to their conclusions of probability. The rule of 
probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception 
affording the best compromise that has been found for 
accommodating these often opposing interests. 
Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To 
allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at 
the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice. 
SpurgeOH, 904 P.2d at 226 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176, 69 
S. Ct. at 1311). 
Here, the odor of alcohol on Patefield's breath, the 
presence of an opened 12-pack of beer with approximately half of 
the containers missing, and coolers in which cold beer might have 
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been stored within Patefield's and defendant's reach, 
collectively suggest that there was a ''substantial chance" that 
Patefield had an open container of beer in his van. The trial 
court's finding of probable cause should therefore be affirmed.6 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
NOT IN CUSTODY FOR MIRANDA PURPOSES 
The record provides ample support for the trial court's 
determination that defendant was not in custody when he arrived 
at the lobby of the Public Safety Building. Nevertheless, while 
not attacking the trial court's factual determinations, defendant 
contends he was in custody under the test articulated in State v. 
Mirquet. 268 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995), pet. for rehearing 
pending. As demonstrated below, defendant's reliance on Mirquet 
is misplaced. 
Under Mirquet. the determination of whether a suspect who 
has not been formally arrested is in custody for Miranda purposes 
is guided by consideration of, among other things, (1) the site 
of the interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused on 
the accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were 
6
 With respect to defendant's exigent circumstances 
argument, this Court need only recognize that Patefield's van was 
stopped on a public highway. Assuming the establishment of 
probable cause, it was therefore subject to a warrantless search 
under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. State 
v. Anderson, 283 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 18 (Utah 1996). 
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present; and (4) the length and form of interrogation. Mirquet. 
268 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4. In Mirquet. all of these factors 
weighed in favor of finding defendant was in custody. 
In Mirquet. the defendant was seated in a police car to 
receive a speeding ticket when the arresting officer raised the 
totally unrelated issue of marijuana use by telling the 
defendant: "It's obvious to me you've been smoking marijuana. 
You know, there's no doubt in my mind. Would you like to go to 
the car and get the marijuana, or do you want me to go get it?" 
Mirquet. 268 Utah Adv. Rep. at 3. The Supreme Court 
characterized the officer's accusatory questioning as "a virtual 
command . . . to retrieve evidence of a crime that was clearly 
incriminating." Id. at 5. 
This case is plainly distinguishable from Mirquet. Here, the 
trial court found that, while defendant was seized insofar as he 
needed to come to the sheriff's office to get his citation, 
defendant "freely" decided to drive Patefield's van to the Public 
Safety Building in order to save Patefield the cost of having it 
towed and impounded (R. 81-82). Upon his arrival, defendant was 
neither handcuffed nor taken to an interrogation room; rather, 
Eldredge met him in the lobby (R. 32, 42-3, 82) . Eldredge asked 
defendant a single question(how long had defendant owned his dog) 
that was not "an accusatory question" (R. 82). Finally, Eldredge 
had previously made clear to defendant that, while he was going 
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to be cited for possession of drug paraphernalia, only Patefield 
was under arrest (R. 27-30), which is why defendant was permitted 
to drive Patefield's van. In sum, none of the indicia of arrest 
were present, defendant's freedom of movement was essentially 
unrestricted, the "interrogation" consisted of but one non-
accusatory question, and defendant had previously been told that 
he was not going to be arrested. The mere fact that the question 
was asked of defendant while he was at the Public Safety Building 
does not compel the conclusion that defendant was in custody. 
Mirquet. 268 Utah Adv. Rep. at 5. The trial court's 
determination that defendant was not in custody for Miranda 
purposes should therefore be affirmed. 
STATEMENT REQAfrPINg NEED FOR QRAL ARGUMENT 
AND pgglfrABIfrlTY QF QFFICIAL PUBLICATION 
The facts of this case are straightforward, and the legal 
doctrines at issue are well established. The State therefore 
does not request oral argument or the issuance of an opinion 
designated nFor Official Publication." 
In the event this Court decides to schedule oral argument in 
either this case or in co-defendant Patefield's case, State v. 
Patefield, No. 950736-CA, then oral argument should be granted in 
both cases. 
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CONCISION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, defendant's convictions 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //^day of March, 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
TODD A. UTZINGI 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
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ADDENDUM A 
Transcript of Trial Court's Oral Findings of Fact and 
Denial of Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
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was still something that — that was something the officer 
was entitled to do* There was, after all, a violation of 
the law here, which the officer had the right to cite or see] 
corrected on the spot. And, so if Mr. Patefield understood 
it that way and that's why he felt compelled to walk to the 
back of the car, that was something that was perfectly 
permissible as well. It just meant that it remained at a 
level 2 citizen-police encounter with no expanded scope, 
that is, the scope is the license plate light period. So, 
whether it was a level 1 or level 2 stop at the time where 
he smelled the — the officer smelled the alcohol on Mr. 
Patefield's breath, the officer had the right to be there. 
And, he smelled the odor of alcohol on Mr. Patefield's 
breath. He had, also, being where he had every right to be, 
observed these cartons, these twelve packs of beer, one of 
which had been opened and containers from which were 
missing. And, really the only question I think in this case] 
worth addressing is whether the probable — whether the 
combination of those things taken in view of all the 
circumstances, these twelve packs of beer, one of which had 
clearly been opened and from which containers were missing 
combined with the odor of alcohol on a driver's breath, 
whether those combined make it more likely than not that 
there will be — that this individual has had an open 
container in the vehicle or that there has been someone in 
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the vehicle. I think there would be. I think — In this 
case, it turned out that there wasn't. But, I think more 
than fifty-one cases out of a hundred, you would — you 
would find an open container of alcohol with this 
combination of circumstances. For that reason, I find that 
there was probable cause to search this vehicle for open 
containers. And, in the process of that search, the officer] 
looked in one of the most likely places, right behind the 
driver's seat, and in that process smelled the odor of 
marijuana, which then gave, under the (inaudible) probable 
cause, to search for marijuana. He was able to search for 
marijuana, and once he found that, other drugs. 
The question of Mr. Wiley's statement in response to a 
question, I find that that was interrogation because the 
officer by this time had seen the dog tag. That's right 
isn't it? By this time he had seen the dog tag, so he was 
asking that question not just out of ideal curiosity, but —I 
not to pass the time of day, but to connect Mr. Wiley to the} 
dog tag, which tied him to the fanny pack in which the 
marijuana was located. The other prong of the analysis 
there is whether. Mr. Wiley was in custody. And I don't 
believe Mr. Wiley was in custody. From all the facts and 
circumstances of this case, I believe Mr. Wiley was acting 
to help Mr. Patefield out — helping Mr. Patefield avoid 
impoundment of his vehicle and was simply driving up to the 
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he could use it to write out the citation. But, it did meaq 
that Mr. Wiley was going to need to come to the Public 
Safety Building in order to get his citation and his license] 
back. 
MS REILLY: Your Honor, with respect to this 
matter and in light of the court's ruling, we wish to enter 
conditional pleas of guilty at this time and ask the court 
accept the conditional pleas, because we intend to notice ofl 
appeal on this matter. And, also, I would ask in advance if] 
the court would stay the sentence pending appeal. I 
understand that Mr. Wiley has a bail. I'm advised — a bail] 
that's already set up. 
THE COURT: Are you agreeing to a conditional 
plea here, Mr. Halls? 
MR. HALLS: Well, I was just trying to run 
through it in my mind. If we go through a trial in the 
matter and spend a couple of days, then they can still 
appeal it on the same issue. So, I'm not sure I gain 
anything by not agreeing to conditional — conditional 
pleas. If they're going to plead to the — to this as 
charged, they can appeal it back to the trial anyway, so I 
guess I really don't have any objection to it. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MS REILLY: Do you wish us to come forward, 
Your Honor? 
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